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Abstract
For all life water is necessary. For many uses it is convenient.
In much of its functioning it is commonplace.
But commonplace things often are the least appreciated and
the hardest to understand . . . . In considering its uses and abundance
and properties, however, we must keep in mind this main
fact: Water is needed for life.
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For all life water is necessary. For many uses it is convenient.
In much of its functioning it is commonplace.
But commonplace things often are the least appreciated and
the hardest to understand . . . . In considering its uses and abun-
dance and properties, however, we must keep in mind this main
fact: Water is needed for life.'
These words are especially meaningful today in light of recurrent
water shortages across the United States. There is an honest realization
that to sustain an ample supply of water, sensible planning, control,
and fairness is required. Recurrent shortages are triggered by various
conditions: supply and demand imbalance; population shifts to the sun-
belt states resulting in locally and regionally concentrated consumptive
increases in areas with scant water resources; pollution of lakes,
streams, and ground water; acid rain pollution; and industrial or agri-
cultural demand.2 It has been said that "[t]he water crisis of the 1980s
and 1990s will rival the oil crisis of the 1970s." 3 The demands for
human survival, for economic stability and growth, and for achieving
the goal of energy self-sufficiency - which overtax the water supply -
have naturally given rise to friction between those who have and those
who do not have.
The United States Supreme Court, in the landmark case of
Sporhase v. Nebraska4 furnishes present-day guidelines whereby con-
frontations may be avoided between those who need water and those
who control its distribution. The opinion specifically addresses the sen-
sitive issue of interstate transfer of ground water.5 The Court declared
1. R. CLARK, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 2.1 (1967 & Supp. 1978).
2. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WATER ISSUES FACING THE NATION: AN
OVERVIEW (May 6, 1982). See also Canby, Our Most Precious Resource: Water, 158-
2 NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC 144 (August, 1980).
3. Quade, Water Wars Predicted in a Thirsty Nation, 68 A.B.A. J. 1066 (1982).
4. 102 S. Ct. 3456 (1982).
5. Water is generally categorized as follows: 1) "Lakes and streams on the sur-
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face": bodies of water on beds within well defined boundaries; 2) "Surface water":
water "from rains, springs and melting snow and ice, and which follows the contours of
the land and has not yet reached a well defined water course or basin . . . .Surface
waters have not yet reached a stream or lake."; 3) "Underground or percolating
water": "below surface [water which] seeps, oozes or filters into the earth from the
surface and moves, drips or flows among the interstices of the earth." R. BOYER, SUR-
VEY OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 276-77 (3d ed. 1981). This note will refer to under-
ground or percolating water as ground water.
The legal aspects of interstate ground water transfer are to be distinguished from
the devices governing interstate surface water transfer and diversion (surface water
used to encompass those waters within or without well defined boundaries). The two
major devices employed in the area of interstate surface water transfer and diversion
are as follows:
1) Equitable Apportionment Doctrine: "Equitable apportionment is the doctrine of
federal common law that governs disputes between states concerning their rights to use
the water of an interstate stream." Colorado v. New Mexico, 102 S. Ct. 539, 545
(1982) (Colorado sought equitable apportionment of the Vermejo River in order to
divert river's waters for future uses; case remanded to Special Master for additional
fact finding to enable Supreme Court to apply equitable apportionment doctrine). The
doctrine attempts to assure an equitable allocation of water among the states appurte-
nant to the interstate body of surface water.
2) Interstate Compacts: U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 is the constitutional basis
authorizing states to negotiate compacts: "No State shall, without the consent of Con-
gress enter into any agreement or compact with another State, or with a foreign
Power . . " The interstate compact is preceded by negotiations between the states
involved. Frequently, there is a federal representative present to assist in the negotia-
tions. Finally, the negotiation process will generally be followed by Congress' imprima-
tur, known as Congressional consenting legislation, with or without modification. See
generally 2 R. CLARK, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS §§ 133.1-133.4 (1967 & Supp.
1978).
Congressional consent, when required, may be inferred from a statute or
pattern of enactments, may take the form of prior authorization as well as
that of subsequent approval, and may be conditioned on state acceptance
of congressionally mandated modifications. Whether or not the United
States chooses to become one of the compacting parties, a valid compact is
binding on the citizens of the signatory states, may be enforced by federal
statute, and itself operates as federal law in the sense that construction of
its terms is a federal question for purposes of Supreme Court review of a
state court decision and in the further sense that signatory states cannot
plead state law, even state constitutional law, as a defense to compliance
with the compact's terms as construed by the Supreme Court.
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-31, at 402 (1978 & Supp. 1979)
(footnotes omitted).
For examples of an interstate compact, see Susquehanna River Basin Compact,
2
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water an article of commerce,' thereby bringing water within the pur-
view of the Constitution's Commerce Clause,7 and furthermore, pro-
scribed as unconstitutional a provision in a Nebraska "embargo" stat-
ute regulating the interstate transfer of ground water.' The Sporhase
decision promulgates new water law and policy, and represents a step
toward moderating the controversy regarding the interstate transfer of
ground water.
This note will examine the history of attempted interstate transfer
of natural resources, culminating in an analysis of the Sporhase deci-
sion and its implications, both present and future. It will also review
selected cases of current litigation and policy in the area of water
transfer, primarily focusing on the interstate transfer of ground water,
considering the state interest weighed against both private need and the
national interest. In order to effectively implement the Sporhase deci-
sion, this note proposes the elimination of all absolute and reciprocal
water embargo statutes as facially discriminatory legislation, and con-
sequently unconstitutional. Moreover, this note supports the employ-
ment of the Pike v. Bruce Church9 Commerce Clause balancing test by
Pub. L. No. 91-575, 84 Stat. 1509 (1970) and the Great Lakes Basin Compact, Pub.
L. No. 90-419, 82 Stat. 414 (1968).
6. Sporhase, 102 S. Ct. 3456.
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, provides in part: "The Congress shall have Power...
To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes."
8. Sporhase, 102 S. Ct. at 3465, 3467 (invalidating reciprocity provision of NEB.
REV. STAT. § 46-613.01 (1978)). The water "embargo" statutes are classified as abso-
lute, reciprocal, or discretionary and seek to prohibit or control the flow of water out-
of-state. The Sporhase Nebraska statute was a discretionary-reciprocal-absolute stat-
ute. It was discretionary in that authorization by the Nebraska Director of Water Re-
sources was required prior to withdrawal of intrastate ground water for transport and
ultimate use interstate. The statute was reciprocal because unless the state to which
water was to be transferred from Nebraska provided for reciprocal transfer rights, no
water was to be removed from Nebraska. The statute was absolute because Colorado,
the state to which appellants Sporhase and Moss needed to transfer water from their
Nebraska property, did not provide for reciprocal transfer rights. Consequently,
Sporhase and Moss were absolutely prohibited from transferring water to Colorado,
regardless of their application to the Nebraska Director of Water Resources. It was the
reciprocity provision, discussed supra text accompanying notes 112-116, of the Ne-
braska statute which was declared unconstitutional.
9. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
525[1
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which to scrutinize state regulation of the interstate transfer of ground
water by a state's use of discretionary water embargo statutes. Lastly,
this note recommends the use of interstate compacts ° to terminate the
interstate rivalries concomitant with interstate ground water transfer.
The application of the interstate compact device and the Commerce
Clause doctrine are necessary tools to govern in an area which requires
and will continue to require the equitable distribution of a precious and
rapidly vanishing natural resource, and as of recent, article of
commerce.
Natural Resources and the Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause has been the primary vehicle by which
complainants have challenged a state's attempted sheltering of its natu-
ral resources. The cases employing this approach demonstrate a grad-
ual erosion of the concept of state ownership in natural resources. Al-
though considered natural treasures, these resources were also
recognized as objects of commerce and, ultimately, objects of profit.
The Commerce Clause proscribes state regulation which impedes the
free flow of commerce across state lines. Consequently, regulations that
attempt to hinder divestment of a state's natural resources destined for
interstate commerce repeatedly have been struck down as an unconsti-
tutional interference with interstate commercial undertakings.
Almost a century ago, the case of Geer v. Connecticut" addressed
the issue of whether a Connecticut statute regulating the transportation
of animals ferae naturae2 out-of-state, after being lawfully killed
within this state, violated the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.
Edgar M. Geer was charged with and convicted of "unlawfully receiv-
ing and having in his possession . . . with the unlawful intent to pro-
cure the transportation beyond the limits of this state, certain wood-
cock, ruffled grouse and quail killed within this state .... "V13
10. See supra note 5 for a discussion on interstate compacts.
11. 161 U.S. 519 (1896), overruled, Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
12. "Animals which are by nature wild are so designated, by way of distinction
from such as are naturally tame .... . BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 558 (5th ed.
1979).
13. State v. Geer, 61 Conn. 144, 148-49, 22 A. 1012, 1012 (1891).
4
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Relying primarily on English and French common law14 authoriz-
ing the regulation of hunting animals ferae naturae based upon the
principle of common ownership,15 the right of a state to govern for the
benefit of its people,16 and the concept that the game never entered the
stream of interstate commerce, the Supreme Court affirmed Geer's
conviction. The Court, in referencing Gibbons v. Ogden 7 and The
14. Blackstone, interpreting English common law, wrote: "[I]t follows from the
very end and constitution of society that this natural right [of man to pursue and take
for his own use animalsferae naturae] ... may be restrained by positive laws enacted
for reasons of state or for the supposed benefit of the community." Geer v. Connecticut,
161 U.S. 519, 527 (1896) (quoting 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 410). The
Napoleanic Code, symbolizing French common law, noted the implications of the com-
mon ownership doctrine: "There are things which belong to no one, and the use of
which is common to all. Police regulations direct the manner in which they may be
enjoyed." Geer, 161 U.S. at 526 (quoting NAPOLEANIC CODE arts. 714, 715).
15. The common ownership doctrine stipulates that natural resources:
are the common property of all citizens of the governmental unit and that
the government, as a sort of trustee, exercises this 'ownership' for the ben-
efit of its citizens .... Each government may ... regulate the corpus of
the trust in the way best suited to the interests of the beneficial owners, its
citizens, and may discriminate as it sees fit against persons lacking any
beneficial interest.
Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 399-400 (1948). See also Geer, 161 U.S. 519.
16. The sole consequence of the provision forbidding the transportation of
game, killed within the State, beyond the State, is to confine the use of
such game to those who own it, the people of that State. The proposition
that the State may not forbid carrying it beyond their limits involves,
therefore, the contention that a State cannot allow its own people the en-
joyment of the benefits of the property belonging to them in common,
without at the same time permitting the citizens of other States to partici-
pate in that which they do not own. . . .The common ownership imports
the right to keep the property, if the sovereign so chooses, always within its
jurisdiction for every purpose.
Geer, 161 U.S. at 529-30.
The Court, quoting from Ex parte Maier, reinforced its position:
The wild game within a state belongs to the people in their collective, sov-
ereign capacity; It is not the subject of private ownership, except in so far
as the people may elect to make it so; and they may, if they see fit, abso-
lutely prohibit the taking of it, or any traffic and commerce in it, if deemed
necessary for its protection or preservation, or the public good.
Id. at 529 (quoting Ex parte Maier, 103 Cal. 476, 483, 37 P. 402, 404 (1894).
17. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (state grant of authority to operate steamboat
5271Water Transfer17:1983
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Daniel Ball,18 stated that the statute regulated Connecticut's internal
commerce and had no effect on external commerce with other states.
Therefore, there was no violation of the Commerce Clause which regu-
lated commerce "among the several states." 19
An early case which specifically addressed the interstate diversion
of water was Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter.20 Justice
Holmes, writing for the majority, affirmed the state court's issuance of
an injunction against Hudson County Water Company's anticipated di-
version of water from New Jersey to Staten Island, New York. Hudson
County Water Company, a New Jersey corporation, had contracted
with the City of New York to supply the borough of Staten Island with
a minimum 3,000,000 gallons of water a day, which were to be diverted
from the Passiac River in New Jersey through water mains across state
lines to New York. New Jersey sued to enjoin performance of the con-
tract which it saw as a clear violation of state law. 21 Hudson argued the
statute violated the Constitution in that it impaired the obligation of
contracts, took property without due process of law, interfered with
commerce between the states, denied the privileges of New Jersey citi-
zens to citizens of other states, and denied citizens of other states equal
protection of the law.22 Justice Holmes dismissed these contentions
briefly with partial reliance on Geer.23
The state courts had identified Hudson County Water Company as
a "riparian proprietor, '2 4 and as such, had "no right to divert waters
monopoly on New York waters declared unconstitutional as conflicting with Congres-
sional power to regulate navigation).
18. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1871) (ships operating solely on intrastate waters
could be regulated by Congress if those ships were transporting goods interstate).
19. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
20. 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
21. The challenged New Jersey statute read: "It shall be unlawful for any person
or corporation to transport or carry, through pipes, conduits, ditches or canals, the
waters of any fresh water lake, pond, brook, creek, river or stream of this State into
any other State, for use therein." 1905 N.J. Laws 461. For the current statute on the
subject of water diversion, see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:IA-5 (West 1982).
22. Hudson, 209 U.S. at 354.
23. 161 U.S. 519.
24. Hudson, 209 U.S. at 354. The riparian doctrine is a system of water law
mainly followed in Great Britain and the eastern United States. It permits owners of
land appurtenant to water to make reasonable use of the water and provides for a
6
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for more than a reasonable distance from the body of the stream or for
other than the well-known ordinary uses, and that for any purpose any-
where he is narrowly limited in amount. 26 Justice Holmes broadened
the justification for the injunction, attributing its employment to the
state's police power: "The limits set to property by other public inter-
ests present themselves as a branch of what is called the police power
of the State. '26 The public interests cited by Justice Holmes included
maintaining an undiminished river flow-to protect the public health and
welfare. "This public interest is omnipresent wherever there is a State,
and grows more pressing as population grows. It is fundamental, and
we are of opinion that the private property of riparian proprietors can-
not be supposed to have deeper roots. 27 In emphasizing the sovereign's
"correlative right protecting against unreasonable use by others that substantially di-
minishes the quantity or quality of water." 7 R. CLARK, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS
310 (1967 & Supp. 1978). The "water right is regarded as 'usufructuary,' a right of
use and not an interest in the corpus of the water supply. . . [R]iparian rights origi-
nate from landownership and are dependent upon physical location, i.e., contiguity of
land to a body of water . . . . Riparian rights . . . remain 'vested' though unexer-
cised." 1 R. CLARK, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 51.9 (1967 & Supp. 1978).
25. Hudson, 209 U.S. at 354.
26. Id. at 355.
27. Id. at 356. Furthermore, Justice Holmes added that "it is recognized that the
State as quasi-sovereign and representative of the interests of the public has a standing
in court to protect the atmosphere, the water and the forests within its territory, irre-
spective of the assent or dissent of the private owners of the land most immediately
concerned." Id. at 355, citing three cases:
(1) Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902). This controversy between two states
triggered the original jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court. Kansas sought
injunctive relief to bar Colorado from diverting waters from the Arkansas River which
originated in Colorado but flowed through both Kansas and Colorado. The Supreme
Court recognized the complexity of the issues'and questions raised, overruled a demur-
rer by Colorado, and requested a factual presentation by both parties in order to rule
effectively.
(2) Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907). Facts were compiled and presented to
the Supreme Court in this proceeding five years after the litigation was initiated. The
Court dismissed Kansas' complaint in a lengthy opinion which concluded that Kansas
suffered minimally from Colorado's water diversions resulting in diminution of river
flow through Kansas. The Court felt that Colorado diverted water for a reasonable use
- irrigation - and that there was an equitable apportionment of the Arkansas River
waters between the two states.
(3) Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907). This case involved an
5291
17:1983
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independent authority, Justice Holmes claimed that the state need not
justify its protective stance. "[The State] finds itself in possession of
what all admit to be a great public good, and what it has it may keep
and give no one a reason for its will."28
Despite Justice Holmes' views, however, the Court in West v. Kan-
sas Natural Gas Co.29 began to dismantle the state police power theory
of control and ownership of natural resources. Kansas Natural Gas
Company joined forces with three other complainants to attack an
Oklahoma statute30 regulating the interstate transport of natural gas as
violative of the Commerce Clause. The complainants had secured the
rights to construct natural gas wells on Oklahoma land and, in addi-
tion, had purchased the rights of way to lay pipes for the interstate
injunction issued in Georgia's favor against the public nuisance of air pollution from
Tennessee Copper Company's out-of-state plant.
28. Hudson, 209 U.S. at 357. "[T]he constitutional power of the State to insist
that its natural advantages shall remain unimpaired by its citizens is not dependent
upon any nice estimate of the extent of present use or speculation as to future needs."
Id. at 356-57. As previously discussed in the introduction and as will later be devel-
oped, population growth is a material factor in the argument for transfer of water to
satisfy justifiable needs. Furthermore, the state, in attempting to enjoin interstate di-
version/transfer of water, must justify its laws regulating such transfer, particularly
under Commerce Clause analysis. See, e.g., Sporhase v. Nebraska, 102 S. Ct. 3456
(1982). See supra text accompanying notes 101-119.
29. 221 U.S. 229 (1911).
30. The Oklahoma statute, in part, read:
§ 2. No corporation organized for the purpose of, or engaged in the trans-
portation or transmission of natural gas within this State shall be granted
a charter or right of eminent domain, or right to use the highways of this
State unless it shall be expressly stipulated in such charter that it shall
only transport or transmit natural gas through its pipe lines to points
within this State; that it shall not connect with, transport to, or deliver
natural gas to individuals, associations, copartnership companies or corpo-
rations engaged in transporting or furnishing natural gas to points, places
or persons outside of this State.
§ 3. Foreign corporations formed for the purpose of, or engaged in the
business of transporting or transmitting natural gas by means of pipe lines,
shall never be licensed or permitted to conduct such business within this
State.
1907 Okla. Sess. Laws 586-87. See West, 221 U.S. at 239-43 n.1 for text of the statute
in its entirety. For the current statute on the subject, see OKLA STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§
1, 3, 4, 5, 7 (West 1969 & Supp. 1982-83).
1530 7:1983 1
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transmission and eventual sale of the natural gas. The Oklahoma stat-
ute prohibited the transportation of natural gas over the state highways
or transmission of the natural gas through pipelines within the state, to
destinations outside the state. The Circuit Court of the United States
for the Eastern District of Oklahoma issued a "perpetual" injunction
against the statute's enforcement, declaring the statute's aims, as scru-
tinized under the authority of the Commerce Clause, "unreasonable,
unconstitutional, invalid and void, "and of no force or effect
whatever . .
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Oklahoma argued
that "the statute's 'ruling principle is conservation, not commerce; that
the due process clause is the single issue.' And due process, it is urged,
is not violated, because the statute is not a taking of property, but a
regulation of it under the police power of the State. ' 32 Despite the
state's effort, the Supreme Court affirmed the Circuit Court's decision,
and articulated its rejection of the state's position:
The results of the contention repel its acceptance. Gas, when re-
duced to possession, is a commodity; it belongs to the owner of the
land, and, when reduced to possession, is his individual property
subject to sale by him, and may be a subject of intrastate com-
merce and interstate commerce. The statute . . . recognizes [gas]
to be a subject of intrastate commerce, but seeks to prohibit it from
being the subject of interstate commerce, and this is the purpose of
its conservation. In other words, the purpose of the conservation is
in a sense commercial - the business welfare of the State, as coal
might be, or timber. Both of those products may be limited in
amount, and the same consideration of the public welfare which
would confine gas to the use of the inhabitants of a State would
confine [the coal or timber] to the inhabitants of the State. If the
States have such power a singular situation might result. Penn-
sylvania might keep its coal, the Northwest its timber, the mining
states their minerals . . . . To what consequences does such power
31. West, 221 U.S. at 248 (citing Kansas Natural Gas Co. v. Haskell, 172 F.
545 (C.C.E.D. Okla. 1909) (prior to 1912, the judicial system was structured differ-
ently. See C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 1, at 1-6
(1976)).
32. West, 221 U.S. at 249.
531 11 7:1983
9
Betensky: Water Transfer: Shall We Sink or Swim Together?
Published by NSUWorks, 1983
tend? If one State has it, all States have it; embargo may be retali-
ated by embargo, and commerce will be halted at state lines."3
The objective of the Commerce Clause to foster the free flow of com-
merce among and between the states was clearly frustrated by the
Oklahoma statute. Therefore, the statute was declared unconstitu-
tional, and a permanent injunction issued against its operation.
The West Court highlighted the national concerns implicit in
avoiding the creation of "embargo" legislation. Nonetheless, the con-
troversy continued in Pennsylvania v. West Virginia,34 this time on a
larger scale between three states. Pennsylvania and Ohio sought a pro-
hibitory injunction against the operation and enforcement of a West
Virginia statute.3 5 The statute recognized an anticipated depletion of
natural gas resources within West Virginia and sought to prefer intra-
state consumers as the supply diminished. Again, this attempted re-
straint of "an established current of commerce"361 was challenged as
forbidden by the Commerce Clause. At the time, West Virginia was
the leading producer of natural gas in the United States and had nur-
tured and promoted its position by developing an intrastate, as well as
interstate, market. 7 For years before the suit, the bordering states of
Pennsylvania and Ohio relied heavily on West Virginia gas for private
and public consumption. 8 As its gas fields began to show signs of ex-
33. Id. at 255 (emphasis added).
34. 262 U.S. 553 (1923).
35. 1919 W. Va. Acts ch. 71.
36. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. at 591.
37. Id. at 597-98.
Much of the business is interstate and has grown up through the course of
years. West Virginia encouraged and sanctioned the development of that
part of the business and has profited greatly by it. Her present effort,
rightly understood, is to subordinate that part to the local business within
her borders. In other words, it is in effect an attempt to regulate the inter-
state business to the advantage of the local consumers. But this she may
not do.
Id.
38. "In West Virginia the production of natural gas began as much as thirty
years ago and for the last fourteen years has been greater than in any other State. The
producing fields include thirty-two of her fifty-five counties." Id. at 586. The Court also
noted that the gas was used by 300,000 consumers and ultimately provided for
1,500,000 persons in Pennsylvania and 725,000 consumers, ultimately 3,625,000 per-
532 Nova Law Journal 7:1983 1
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haustion, West Virginia moved to protect local needs. It exhibited a
preference for its inhabitants in the purchase and sale of the resource
by withdrawing "a large volume of the gas from an established inter-
state current whereby it is supplied in other States to consumers
there." 9
The Court recognized the probable ramifications of the statute's
enforcement,'40 but avoided those negative results by relying on the pur-
pose behind the Commerce Clause and prior case law including West.41
The injunction was issued and the Court advised that if interstate regu-
lation of natural gas was necessary, assistance should be sought from
Congress.
Justice Holmes vigorously dissented here, as in West, promoting
his notion of a state's police power to control its resources. "I see noth-
ing in the commerce clause to prevent a State from giving a preference
to its inhabitants in the enjoyment of its natural advantages."' 2 Justice
Holmes, echoing his opinion in Hudson County Water Co. v. Mc-
Carter,'3 emphasized the right of the state to provide for its local
needs.
Although not a "natural resources" case, H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc.
v. DuMond44 offered an analysis of the Commerce Clause, helpful to
the understanding of the "resources" controversy. The seminal case of
its time, Hood, surveyed the field of Commerce Clause litigation and
sons, in Ohio. "To change to other fuel would require an adjustment of heating and
cooking appliances at an average cost of more than $100 for each domestic consumer,
or an aggregate cost exceeding $30,000,000 in Pennsylvania and $72,500,000 in Ohio."
Id. at 590.
39. Id. at 595.
40. Id. at 596.
The question is an important one; for what one State may do others may,
and there are ten States from which natural gas is exported for consump-
tion in other States. Besides, what may be done with one natural product
may be done with others, and there are several States in which the earth
yields products of great value which are carried into other States and there
used.
Id.
41. 221 U.S. 229.
42. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. at 602.
43. 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
44. 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
1I I
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emphasized the national economic interest as more imperative than the
state's internal economic preoccupation. The Hood Company, a milk
distributor, was denied a license by the New York Commissioner of
Agriculture and Markets to open and operate an additional distribution
plant at Greenwich, New York. Hood purchased raw milk from farm-
ers, which it then tested, weighed, and cooled for eventual shipment. It
was conceded that Hood's entire business, both present and future, was
interstate.45
In denying the license, the New York Commissioner guided by
state law, concluded: "The issuance of a license to [the] applicant
which would permit it to operate an additional plant, would tend to a
destructive competition in a market already adequately served, and
would not be in the public interest. '46 Justice Cardozo, writing for a
unanimous Court in the earlier case of Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc.,'7
had struck down a New York statute which attempted to bar the im-
portation of milk from Vermont. The legislation was declared an un-
constitutional burden on interstate commerce. Justice Jackson, writing
for the majority in Hood, compared Baldwin and found the facts there
to be the converse of Hood, but the principles to be identical. Baldwin
involved the attempted curtailment of importation, while Hood in-
volved a similar restraint on the exportation of a commodity. "In
neither case is the measure supported by health or safety considerations
but solely by protection of local economic interests, such as supply for
local consumption and limitation of competition. '48
Justice Jackson, referencing Justice Cardozo's view in Baldwin,
noted the economic mission of the Hood statute, as distinguished from
a legitimate objective of guarding the health, safety, and welfare of a
state's citizens. It was this economic objective, in light of the Com-
merce Clause and its functions, which was precisely at "the root of its
invalidity."'49 In examining the early history of the Commerce Clause,
Justice Jackson found that "[t]he desire of the Forefathers to federal-
ize regulation of foreign and interstate commerce [stood] in sharp con-
trast to their jealous preservation of the state's power over its internal
45. Id. at 526.
46. Id. at 529.
47. 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
48. Hood, 336 U.S. at 531.
49. Id. at 532.
12
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affairs. No other federal power was so universally assumed to be neces-
sary, no other state power was so readily relinquished. '5
0
Justice Cardozo in Baldwin had marked the parameters limiting
state regulation: "What is ultimate is the principle that one state in its
dealings with another may not place itself in a position of economic
isolation. ' 51 Justice Jackson, in Hood, noted the probable consequences
of "embargo" statutes as the result of the "established interdependence
of the states .... "52 He foresaw states coveting their treasures of
copper, timber, ore, cotton, oil, and gas. "What fantastic rivalries and
dislocations and reprisals would ensue if such practices were begun!" 58
. By the mid 1960's, conservation of our natural resources was a
national concern. Although the country had experienced incidental
water shortages throughout the first half of the century, the first mean-
ingful water related case following the 1908 dispute in Hudson," was
City of Altus v. Carr55 in 1965. The controversy stemmed from a
Texas statute56 limiting the transport of water to other states and an
Oklahoma city's dire need of outside water supplies.
5 7
An engineering firm, hired by the city of Altus, Oklahoma to lo-
cate alternative sources of water, recommended tapping the subsurface
water reserve under six of the 5,663 contiguous acres of Texas land
owned by plaintiffs C.F. and Pauline Mock. The land bordered
Oklahoma and was fourteen miles from the city of Altus. The city of
Vernon, Texas, just south of the Mocks' land, was already drawing
50. Id. at 533-34.
51. Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 527.
52. Hood, 336 U.S. at 538.
53. Id. at 538-39.
54. 209 U.S. 349.
55. 255 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex.), aff'd mem., 385 U.S. 35 (1966).
56. The statute stated: "No one shall withdraw water from any underground
source in this State by drilling a well in Texas and transporting the water outside the
boundaries of the State unless the same be specifically authorized by an Act of the
Texas Legislature and thereafter as approved by it." TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 7477b
(Vernon 1965). Statute held void in City of Altus, 255 F. Supp. 828, and therefore
omitted from TEXAS WATER CODE ANN. § 5.096 (Vernon 1972 & Supp. 1982-83).
57. The City of Altus, Oklahoma experienced a rapid population boom from 9,
735 persons in 1959 to approximately 23,500 persons at the time of suit in 1966. City
of Altus, 255 F. Supp. at 831 n.3. Available water supplies from the W.C. Austin
Project of the United States Bureau of Reclamation were limited. Id. at 831.
!
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from this "natural subsurface water-bearing formation ' 58 of high qual-
ity percolating ground water. The Mocks and the city of Altus exe-
cuted a lease which granted the city of Altus the land "for the sole and
only purpose of mining and operating for subsurface water and for the
transportation of such water to the city of Altus for its use."5 9 Two
months later, the Texas legislature enacted article 7477be° which effec-
tively barred interstate transfer of water unless the state legislature
first approved the transfer. Thereafter, plaintiffs Mock and the city of
Altus filed suit to permanently enjoin enforcement of the Texas statute
as violative of the Commerce Clause. The Texas state courts had previ-
ously addressed intrastate water rights, l thereby providing some guid-
ance for the federal district court.
The federal district court reiterated the views expressed in Penn-
sylvania v. West Virginia6 2 and West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co. 63 in
finding for the plaintiffs. Water, like gas, when reduced to possession
was considered personal property - a commodity - free for sale in
intrastate or interstate commerce. Regulation restraining transporta-
tion of a commodity was not tolerated under the Commerce Clause and
its theme proscribing burdening and interfering with interstate com-
merce. Texas' argument that the statute's intentions were lawful as an
exercise of the state's police power in the interest of conservation was
discarded." The court eliminated any distinction between a statute
58. Id. at 831.
59. Id. at 832.
60. TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 7477b (Vernon 1965). Statute held void in City of
Altus, and therefore omitted from TEx. WATER CODE ANN. § 5.096 (Vernon 1972 &
Supp. 1982-83).
61. City of Altus, 255 F. Supp. at 832 n.8. See, e.g., City of Corpus Christi v.
City of Pleasanton, 154 Tex. 289, 276 S.W.2d 798 (1955) (declaring that the rule in
Texas permitted a landowner to withdraw as much percolating ground water as neces-
sary for beneficial aims and could thereafter market it as that landowner saw fit).
62. 262 U.S. 553.
63. 221 U.S. 229.
64. City of Altus, 255 F. Supp. at 840.
In the name of conservation, the statute seeks to prohibit interstate ship-
ments of water while indulging in the substantial discrimination of permit-
ting the unrestricted intrastate production and transportation of water be-
tween points within the State, no matter how distant .... Obviously, the
statute had little relation to the cause of conservation.
7:1983
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which restrained the movement of an article in interstate commerce
once reduced to personal property and possession and a statute which
prohibited the withdrawal of ground water, for example, with the intent
to transport it interstate.65
Natural Resources and the Privileges and Immunities Clause
In addition to the Commerce Clause, the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause of Article IV of the Constitution"6 has been asserted as a
basis from which to contest state laws aimed at coveting natural re-
sources solely for intrastate use. An early case which considered the
Privileges and Immunities Clause as related to state regulation of natu-
ral resources was McCready v. Virginia.67 The common or public own-
ership doctrine discussed in Geer v. Connecticut,"8 was also the topic of
controversy in McCready. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of
McCready, a Maryland citizen, for his violation of a Virginia statute69
which prohibited out-of-state citizens from planting oysters in or taking
oysters from Virginia waters. The Court upheld the statute stating that
"[t]he right which the people of the State thus acquire comes not from
their citizenship alone, but from their citizenship and property com-
bined. It is, in fact, a property right, and not a mere privilege or immu-
nity of citizenship."70
For further guidance in its interpretation and application of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, the Court turned to
Corfield v. Coryell,71 in which it was established that "those privileges
and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental. . . belong, of
65. Id.
66. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 2, provides in part: "The Citizens of each State shall
be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."
67. 94 U.S. 391 (1876).
68. 161 U.S. 519 (1896). See also supra note 15 for discussion of the common
ownership doctrine.
69. The Virginia statute read, in part: "If any person other than a citizen of this
State shall take or catch oysters. . . or plant oysters in the waters thereof. . . he shall
forfeit $500, and the vessel, tackle, and appurtenances." 1874 Va. Acts 214.
70. McCready, 94 U.S. at 395. The Court also rejected the notion that the Vir-
ginia statute was an impermissible burden on interstate commerce. Id. at 396-97.
71. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823)(No. 3230) (access to oyster beds
"owned" by New Jersey citizens could be limited solely to New Jersey citizens).
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right, to the citizens of all free governments... "72 and were meant to
be protected by the Clause. The Pennsylvania statute in Corfield, like
the Virginia statute in McCready, established "that it shall not be law-
ful for any person who is not at the time an actual inhabitant and resi-
dent in this state, to rake or gather clams, oysters, or shells, in any of
the rivers, bays, or waters in this state .... ,,73 The Corfield Court
concluded not only that the state could regulate the fisheries within the
state's borders under the common ownership theory, but also that
farming oysters was not considered a "fundamental" privilege of the
citizens of all states.74
The McCready Court, influenced by the Corfield approach, con-
cluded "that the citizens of one State [were] not invested by [the Privi-
leges and Immunities] clause of the Constitution with any interest in
the common property of the citizens of another State. ' 7 5 As in
Corfield, the Court rejected employment of the Commerce Clause to
bolster the challenge against the enforcement of the state statute:
"There is here no question of transportation or exchange of commodi-
ties, but only of cultivation and production. Commerce has nothing to
do with land while producing, but only with the product after it has
become the subject of trade.17 6
72. Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551.
73. Act of June 9, 1820, quoted in Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 548.
74. Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 552. The Court said:
[The fishery] is the property of all [citizens or subjects of the state]; to be
enjoyed by them in subordination to the laws which regulate its use. They
may be considered as tenants in common of this property; and they are so
exclusively entitled to the use of it, that it cannot be enjoyed by others
without the tacit consent . . . of the sovereign who has the power to regu-
late its use.
[I]t would. . . be going quite too far to construe the grant of privi-
leges and immunities of citizens, as amounting to a grant of a cotenancy in
the common property of the state, to the citizens of all the other
states. . . .The oyster beds belonging to a state may be abundantly suffi-
cient for the use of the citizens of that state, but might be totally ex-
hausted and destroyed if the legislature could not so regulate the use of
them as to exclude the citizens of the other states from taking them, ex-
cept under such limitations and restrictions as the laws may prescribe.
Id.
75. McCready, 94 U.S. at 395.
76. Id. at 396.
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In addition to McCready and Corfield, the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause was extensively examined in the Slaughterhouse Cases7
where the Louisiana Legislature created a corporation which monopo-
lized the slaughtering of livestock. Approximately 1000 butchers unsuc-
cessfully challenged the statute as an unconstitutional abridgement of
their rights under the privileges or immunities clause of the fourteenth
amendment.7 8 The majority of the Court concluded that the fourteenth
amendment protected only those privileges and immunities inherent in
United States citizenship, as opposed to the privileges or immunities of
state citizenship."' The Court examined the fourteenth amendment and
said:
It is a little remarkable, if this clause [No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States] was intended as a protection to the
citizen of a State against the legislative power of his own State,
that the word citizen of the State should be left out when it is so
carefully used, and used in contradistinction to citizens of the
United States, in the very sentence which precedes it. It is too clear
for argument that the change in phraseology was adopted under-
standingly and with a purpose. 80
77. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). See supra note 66 for the text of the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of Art. IV.
78. Slaughterhouse, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 66. U.S. CoNsT. amend XIV, § I
provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
The statute was also challenged as an unconstitutional creation of an involuntary servi-
tude prohibited by the thirteenth amendment, and a denial of equal protection and
deprivation of property without due process of law contrary to the proscriptions of the
fourteenth amendment. Slaughterhouse, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 66.
79. Slaughterhouse, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 73-74.
80. Id. at 74. Professor Tribe interpreted the Court's analysis:
The fourteenth amendment retained the distinction between the privileges
of state citizenship and those of national citizenship; therefore, the Court
reasoned, the fourteenth amendment left responsibility over the fundamen-
539 1Water TransferI 7:1983
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The Supreme Court recently discussed the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause in Baldwin v. Fish & Game Commission of Montana,81
where a Montana resident and hunting guide for nonresident hunters
joined with several Minnesota residents to challenge the Montana li-
censing scheme applicable to nonresident hunters. Montana residents
were able to purchase hunting licenses for substantially less cost than
nonresident hunters. 82 Consequently, the statute was attacked as a vio-
lation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV and the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution.
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, noted the scant litiga-
tion and judicial analysis involving the Privileges and Immunities
Clause. Nonetheless, Justice Blackmun formulated what was in his
view the modern articulation of the Clause's purpose and protections:
Some distinctions between residents and nonresidents merely reflect
the fact that this is a Nation composed of individual States, and
are permitted; other distinctions are prohibited because they hinder
the formation, the purpose, or the development of a single Union of
those States. Only with respect to those 'privileges' and 'immuni-
ties' bearing upon the vitality of the nation as a single entity must
the State treat all citizens, resident and nonresident, equally.83
tal rights of state citizenship where it had always rested, in the state gov-
ernments. Since the privilege claimed by the Slaughterhouse plaintiffs
numbered among the rights of state citizenship, they were told to look to
Louisiana for redress: the privileges or immunities clause provided federal
protection only for the rights of national citizenship.
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 7-2, at 419 (1978 & Supp. 1979).
The Court suggested some privileges and immunities of national citizenship
"which owe their existence to the Federal Government, its National character, its Con-
stitution, or its laws." For an enumeration, see Slaughterhouse, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at
79-80.
81. 436 U.S. 371 (1978).
82. In 1975, a Montana resident paid $4 for a license to hunt only elk. A nonres-
ident hunter, on the other hand, paid $151 for a combination license which limited him
to kill only one elk and two deer. In 1976, a Montana resident had the choice between
a combination license for $30 or an elk license for $9, while the nonresident hunter was
required to purchase a combination license only, for $225. Id. at 373-74.
83. Id. at 383.
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Justice Blackmun did not conclude that the Montana elk hunting li-
censing scheme upset the "formation" or "vitality" of the nation, nor
did he consider the issue one of "fundamental," "natural," "basic," or
"essential" rights.8 ' Moreover, Justice Blackmun did not concede the
public ownership theory as defunct despite the weakening effect of ex-
tensive Commerce Clause litigation. Although Justice Blackmun ad-
mitted the theory was "by no means absolute," 85 he found its vitality
evident in Baldwin: "The elk supply, which has been entrusted to the
care of the State by the people of Montana, is finite and must be care-
fully tended in order to be preserved."86
Justice Brennan, joined in his dissent by Justices White and Mar-
shall, was uncomfortable with the majority's emphasis on the "funda-
mental rights" view of the Privileges and Immunities Clause.87 Justice
84. Id. at 387. In Justice Blackmun's words, only "[w]ith respect to such basic
and essential activities, interference with which would frustrate the purposes of the
formation of the Union, the States must treat residents and nonresidents without un-
necessary distinctions." Id.
85. Id. at 385.
86. Id. at 388.
87. The dissenters' discomfort is exemplified through the following comments:
"Corfield's view of the Privileges and Immunities Clause might, and should be, prop-
erly interred as the product of a bygone era .... "Id. at 399 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). Moreover:
The Court concludes that because elk hunting is not a 'basic and essential
activit[y], . . .' the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, § 2
. . . does not prevent Montana from irrationally, wantonly, and even in-
vidiously discriminating against nonresidents seeking to enjoy natural
treasures it alone possesses. I cannot agree that the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause is so impotent a guarantee that such discrimination remains
wholly beyond the purview of that provision.
Id. at 394.
Furthermore, Justice Blackmun's "fundamental rights" view of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause has been challenged and a modern enunciation of its implications
noted:
Toomer v. Witsell dramatically shifted the focus of review under the privi-
leges and immunities clause from categorizing fundamental rights of state
citizenship to analyzing state justifications for maintaining the challenged
discriminatory burdens. A flexible approach that seeks to allow discrimina-
tion but only where necessary was substituted for the rigidity inherent in a
test that cast down any discrimination once found to diminish a fundamen-
tal right of state citizenship.
5411
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Brennan stressed that the burden was on the state to demonstrate a
"substantial reason for the discrimination beyond the mere fact that
they are citizens of other States." 88
Toomer v. Witsell,89 relied on by the dissent in Baldwin, involved
a South Carolina shrimping statute which, among other requirements,
imposed a license fee on nonresidents 100 times as costly as the fee for
residents.90 Earle J. Toomer and five other Georgia fishermen, renounc-
ing the statute's "purpose and effect," claimed the statute was not
meant "to conserve shrimp, but to exclude non-residents and thereby
create a commercial monopoly for South Carolina residents."91 Despite
South Carolina's conservation position, the Court in Toomer struck
down the South Carolina statute because the state had failed to over-
come the constitutional challenge under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause.9 2 The state had neglected to persuade the Court that: "(1) the
presence or activity of nonresidents [was] the source or cause of the
problem or effect with which the State [sought] to deal, (2) the dis-
crimination practiced against nonresidents [bore] a substantial relation
to the problem they present,"9 s and (3) "the actual impracticality of
apparent and less restrictive alternatives.9 4
Furthermore, Justice Brennan challenged the residual vitality of
the public/common ownership property doctrine as the result of its
qualification in Toomer; that is, "[tihe whole ownership theory, in fact,
[was] . ..generally regarded as but a fiction expressive in legal short-
hand of the importance to its people that a State have power to pre-
L. TRIBE, supra note 80, § 6-33, at 410.
88. Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 399-400 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Toomer v.
Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948)). The Privileges and Immunities Clause "was
designed to insure to a citizen of State A who venture[d] into State B the same privi-
leges which the citizens of State B enjoy." Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 399 (quoting Toomer,
334 U.S. at 395). Accordingly, the State first has to justify its attempted discrimina-
tory practice.
89. 334 U.S. 385.
90. 1947 S.C. Acts 281.
91. Toomer, 334 U.S. at 395.
92. Id. at 403. The statute was also declared unconstitutional as a violation of
the Commerce Clause. Id. at 406.
93. Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 402 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See Toomer, 334 U.S. at
396-99.
94. L. TRIBE, supra note 80, § 6-33, at 410. See Toomer, 334 U.S. at 396-99.
1542 Nova Law Journal 7:19831
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serve and regulate the exploitation of an important resource."9 5
Immediately following Baldwin, Justice Brennan grasped the op-
portunity to dispose of the common ownership doctrine in Hughes v.
Oklahoma." William Hughes, who operated a commercial minnow
business in Texas, was convicted of violating an Oklahoma statute
which prohibited the commercial exportation of natural minnows from
Oklahoma streams. Hughes challenged the statute as repugnant to the
Commerce Clause.
In his majority opinion, Justice Brennan agreed that the
Oklahoma statute violated the Commerce Clause, and rejected the
state's reliance on the common ownership rationale. This effectively
overturned the decision in Geer v. Connecticut"' almost a century ear-
lier. Justice Brennan, in his step-by-step dismantling of the Geer com-
mon/public/state ownership doctrine, identified the state's "protection-
ist motive,"98 condemned in West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co.," as the
basis for the demise of Geer. Justice Brennan saw the Privileges and
Immunities Clause analysis applied in Baldwin,1"0 which had shed
doubt on the vitality of Geer, as analogous to the Hughes Commerce
Clause challenge. 10 1
95. Toomer, 334 U.S. at 402. The erosion of the common ownership doctrine can
be seen in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920) where it was said: "To put
the claim of the State upon title is to lean upon a slender reed." See also Douglas v.
Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977) where it was said:
A state does not stand in the same position as the owner of a private game
preserve and it is pure fantasy to talk of 'owning' wild fish, birds, or ani-
mals. Neither the States nor the Federal Government, any more than a
hopeful fisherman or hunter, has title to these creatures until they are re-
duced to possession by skillful capture. . . . Under modern analysis, the
question is simply whether the State has exercised its police power in con-
formity with the federal laws and Constitution.
Id. at 284-85. In essence, it appears that the common ownership doctrine of natural
resources is no more than a slogan employed by the inhabitants of a state to covet its
treasures despite the real need of others.
96. 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
97. 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
98. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 329.
99. 221 U.S. 229 (1911).
100. 436 U.S. 371.
101. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 334. See also Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 531-32
(1978), where Justice Brennan said there is a "mutually reinforcing relationship be-
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Justice Brennan also utilized a functional approach to declare the
Oklahoma statute regulating the interstate transfer of minnows facially
discriminatory, and therefore unconstitutional. This approach had been
utilized before in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.10 2 where the Bruce
Church company grew, harvested, processed, and packed fruits and
vegetables at various plants throughout Arizona and California for ulti-
mate shipment in interstate commerce throughout the nation. The com-
pany employed its California facilities for packing cantaloupes har-
vested in Arizona. Bruce Church, Inc. commenced an action in federal
court to enjoin the operation of the Arizona Fruit and Vegetable
Standardization Act, which in part required that "all cantaloupes
grown in Arizona and offered for sale must 'be packed in regular com-
pact arrangement in closed standard containers approved by the super-
visor . "... , 108 The effect of the Arizona statute was to bar the
Bruce Church company from continued transportation of its canta-
loupes, harvested in Arizona, to its packing facilities in California.
In striking down the Arizona statute as unconstitutional under the
authority of the Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court announced a
more precise rule for purposes of determining the constitutionality of
state statutes in Commerce Clause litigation:
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legiti-
mate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce
are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on
such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question
becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be
tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest
involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser
impact on interstate activities.Y°"
tween the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV, § 2, and the Commerce Clause
.... " Id.
102. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
103. Id. at 138.
104. Id. at 142 (citation omitted). The Court determined, based on this test, that
the Arizona statute burdened interstate commerce:
[T]he State's tenuous interest in having the company's cantaloupes identi-
fied as originating in Arizona cannot constitutionally justify the require-
ment that the company build and operate an unneeded $200,000 packing
1 544 Nova Law Journal
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Justice Brennan, in Hughes, focused on the Pike approach and
noted that the Oklahoma statute banning the interstate transportation
of minnows from Oklahoma streams "overtly block[ed] the flow of in-
terstate commerce at [the] state's borders." 10 5 Futhermore, Justice
Brennan stated that a facially discriminatory statute, like Oklahoma's,
cannot be sanctioned regardless of the state's attempted justification for
its enforcement, because "the evil of protectionism can reside in legisla-
tive means as well as legislative ends."10 6
Sporhase v. Nebraska: Water as an Article of Commerce
Understanding the judicial treatment of the interstate transfer of
natural resources is paramount to recognizing the impact of the United
States Supreme Court decision in Sporhase v. Nebraska.10 7 Until
Sporhase, water was not readily thought of as an article of commerce;
rather, it was widely recognized as a vital natural resource necessary
for economic prosperity and human survival. The Court in Sporhase
classified water as both an article of commerce - thereby bringing it
within the purview of the Commerce Clause - and as a natural
resource.
The Sporhase controversy grew out of a conflict between private
need for water and provisions in the Nebraska statutes which read as
follows:
Any person, firm, city, village, municipal corporation or any other
entity intending to withdraw ground water from any well or pit
located in the State of Nebraska and transport it for use in an
adjoining state shall apply to the Department of Water Resources
plant in [Arizona] .... For the Court has viewed with particular suspi-
cion state statutes requiring business operations to be performed in the
home State that could more efficiently be performed elsewhere. Even
where the State is pursuing a clearly legitimate local interest, this particu-
lar burden on commerce has been declared to be virtually per se illegal.
Id. at 145.
105. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 337 (quoting Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S.
617, 624 (1978)).
106. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 337 (quoting Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at
626).
107. 102 S. Ct. 3456 (1982).
Water Transfer7:1983
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to do so. If the Director of Water Resources finds that the with-
drawal of the ground water requested is reasonable, is not contrary
to the conservation and use of ground water, and is not otherwise
detrimental to the public welfare, he shall grant the permit if the
state in which the water is to be used grants reciprocal rights to
withdraw and transport ground water from that state for use in the
State of Nebraska. 108
In Sporhase, two citizens of Colorado, Joy Sporhase and Delmer
Moss, owned contiguous tracts of land in Nebraska and Colorado.
From a well situated on their Nebraska land, Sporhase and Moss
pumped ground water to irrigate both the Nebraska and Colorado
tracts. They did not seek the required Nebraska permit to transport
water across state lines prior to pumping. Consequently, the State of
Nebraska sued in state court to enjoin Sporhase and Moss from with-
drawing ground water from their well on the Nebraska tract for trans-
port out-of-state. Despite Sporhase's and Moss' defense that the Ne-
braska statute violated the Commerce Clause, the trial court issued an
injunction upon concluding that ground water was not an article of
commerce.
The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed 0 9 and thereby adopted the
trial court's reasoning that, even if water was an article of commerce,
the statute did not "impose an unreasonable burden [on] interstate
commerce." 110 In its examination of Nebraska law, the court explained
that Nebraska had employed the modified American reasonable use
rule governing the rights of water "ownership." ' In essence, the
108. NEB. Riv. STAT. § 46-613.01 (1978).
109. State ex rel. Douglas v. Sporhase, 208 Neb. 703, 305 N.W.2d 614 (1981),
rev'd sub nom. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 102 S. Ct. 3456 (1982).
110. Douglas, 208 Neb. at 705, 305 N.W.2d at 616.
111. Id. at 705, 305 N.W.2d at 617 (citing Olson v. City of Wahoo, 124 Neb.
802, 811, 248 N.W. 304, 308 (1933)).
The American [reasonable use] rule is that the owner of land is entitled to
appropriate subterranean waters found under his land, but he cannot ex-
tract and appropriate them in excess of a reasonable and beneficial use
upon the land which he owns, especially if such use is injurious to others
who have substantial rights to the waters, and if the natural underground
supply is insufficient for all owners, each is entitled to a reasonable propor-
tion of the whole, and while a lesser number of states have adopted this
rule, it is, in our opinion, supported by the better reasoning.
7:1983 1
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state's highest court advocated public ownership of water. The court
dismissed appellants' reliance on City of Altus v. Carr,112 pointing out
that Texas law, in contrast to Nebraska law, had adopted the English
common law rule of absolute ownership in water.1 " Furthermore, the
court distinguished other "natural resource" cases as dealing with re-
sources which "have historically been market items, reducible to pri-
vate possession and freely exchangeable for value."'1 4
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the tables turned;
the State of Nebraska was unable to overcome the Court's characteri-
zation of water as an article of commerce. The Court indicated that the
"States' interest [in water] clearly [had] an interstate dimension,"1 15
Id.
Compare other major riparian rights doctrines applicable to ground water such as
the English Rule, which "recognizes absolute ownership of ground water in the overly-
ing land owner." Douglas, 208 Neb. at 705, 305 N.W.2d at 617; and the Prior Appro-
priation Doctrine, which is a system of water law dominant in'most western states. The
basic tenets of the doctrine are priority of right (first in time, first in right) and actual
use of the water appropriated. Appropriative rights are lost by nonuse. See I R.
CLARK, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTs §§ 51.5-51.9 (1967 & Supp. 1978).
In an attempt to further control and enforce the alleged stat6 "conservation"
objectives, the Nebraska Legislature supplemented Nebraska's judicially imposed mod-
ified American reasonable use rule of ground water rights with: (1) the Nebraska stat-
ute in controversy, NEB. REv. STAT. § 46-613.01 (1978), and (2) inclusion of the
state's recognition of its conservation aims in the state constitution. See NEB. CONST.
art. XV, § 4 which reads: "The necessity of water for domestic use and for irrigation
purposes in the State of Nebraska is hereby declared to be a natural want." See Doug-
las, 208 Neb. at 706, 305 N.W.2d at 617. See also Metropolitan Utilities Dist. v.
Merritt Beach Co., 179 Neb. 783, 801, 140 N.W.2d 626, 637 (1966) in which the
Nebraska Supreme Court held it is "the right of the Legislature, unimpaired, to deter-
mine the policy of the state as to underground waters and the rights of persons in their
use."
112. 255 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex. 1966), affd mem., 385 U.S. 35 (1966).
113. Douglas, 208 Neb. at 708-09, 305 N.W.2d at 618. "Ground water use is
not an unlimited private property right in Nebraska law." Id. Cf City of Altus v. Carr,
255 F. Supp. at 840: "[T]he general law of ... Texas ... recognizes water that has
been withdrawn from under ground sources as personal property and subject to sale
and commerce. .... "
114. Douglas, 208 Neb. at 709-10, 305 N.W.2d at 619. The court, with little
elucidation, said "water is the only natural resource absolutely essential to human sur-
vival," and therefore, rules governing the free flow of commerce in "less essential re-
sources" ought not be applied, if at all, to water. Id. at 710, 305 N.W.2d at 619.
115. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 102 S. Ct. 3456, 3462 (1982).
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despite the State's repeated argument that water was different from
other natural resources. Justice Stevens specifically stressed the "signif-
icant federal interest in conservation as well as in fair allocation of
this diminishing resource."116
The Court was clearly not in harmony with Nebraska's persistence
that water regulation was not to be scrutinized under the auspices of
the Commerce Clause. Although the Court acknowledged and assented
to limited state regulation, particularly in the water-scarce western
states, those states were to achieve their goals of conservation and pres-
ervation within the parameters of the Constitution.117
After establishing the pertinence of the Commerce Clause, the
Court employed the Pikel1 8 test to determine the constitutionality of
the Nebraska statute. The Court agreed that conservation was a legiti-
mate local ambition, identified similar water transport restrictions in-
116. Id. at 3463 (emphasis added). The following are Justice Stevens' remarks in
their entirety:
Although water is indeed essential for human survival, studies indicate
that over 80% of our water supplies is used for agricultural purposes. The
agricultural markets supplied by irrigated farms are worldwide. They pro-
vide the archtypical example of commerce among the several States for
which the Framers of our Constitution intended to authorize federal regu-
lation. The multistate character of the Ogallala aquifer - underlying ap-
pellants' tracts of land in Colorado and Nebraska, as well as parts of
Texas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Kansas - confirms the view that
there is a significant federal interest in conservation as well as in fair
allocation of this diminishing resource.
Id. at 3462-63 (emphasis added). "An acquifer is a geological formation or structure
that transmits water." 5 R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 415 (1981 & Supp.
1982).
117. Sporhase, 102 S. Ct. at 3463.
But appellee's claim that Nebraska ground water is not an article of com-
merce goes too far: it would not only exempt Nebraska ground water regu-
lation from burden-on-commerce analysis, it would also curtail the affirma-
tive power of Congress to implement its own policies concerning such
regulation . . . . If Congress chooses to legislate in this area under its
commerce power, its regulation need not be more limited in Nebraska than
in Texas and States with similar property laws. Ground water overdraft is
a national problem and Congress has the power to deal with it on that
scale.
Id. (citations omitted, emphasis added).
118. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
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trastate, and yielded to Nebraska's "limited preference for its own citi-
zens in the utilization of the resource."" 9 The Sporhase Court
concluded that the first three conditions of section 46-613.01 of the Re-
vised Statutes of Nebraska - i.e., that the requested withdrawal of
ground water was to be reasonable, not contrary to conservation aims,
and not detrimental to the public welfare - did not "impermissibly
burden interstate commerce. 1 20 However, the fourth statutory require-
ment of reciprocity was declared facially discriminatory and, as such,
subject to the "strictest scrutiny." Recognizing that Colorado did not
permit the exportation of its ground water to other states, the Court
found that "the reciprocity provision operate[ed] as an explicit barrier
to commerce between the two States," and was therefore a violation of
the Commerce Clause. 21
119. Sporhase, 102 S. Ct. at 3464.
120. Id. at 3465.
121. Id. "Because of the reciprocity requirement of § 46-613.01, appellants
would not have been granted a permit had they applied for one." Id. at 3458 n.2. The
Court also stated: "We therefore are not persuaded that the reciprocity requirement -
when superimposed on the first three restrictions in the statute - significantly ad-
vances the State's legitimate conservation and preservation interest; it surely is not tai-
lored to serve that purpose." Id. at 3465. The Nebraska Supreme Court decision was
reversed and the case remanded to determine if the reciprocity provision could be sev-
ered from the statute.
Judgment of severance was issued on February 11, 1983 by the Nebraska Su-
preme Court. State ex rel. Douglas v. Sporhase, No. 43206 (Neb. S. Ct. filed Feb. 11,
1983). The court concluded that the unconstitutional reciprocity clause could be sev-
ered after consideration of the following criteria: (1) whether a "workable plan" re-
mained following severance of the unconstitutional reciprocity provision; (2) whether
the invalid reciprocity provision constituted an "inducement" to the enactment of § 46-
613.01 and the overall objectives of Chapter 46 (Irrigation), article 6 (Ground Water);
(3) whether the severance "would frustrate the intent of the [Nebraska] Legislature";
(4) whether a statement of severability was "included in the act, indicating that the
legislature would have enacted the bill absent the invalid portion." Id. at 351-52. The
court announced its decision:
An examination of Chapter 46, article 6, reveals a comprehensive ap-
proach to the conservation and beneficial use of ground water. The striking
of the provision prohibiting transfer of water to nonreciprocating states
does not weaken or otherwise impair the operation of the act. . . . The
remainder of § 46-613.01, after the unconstitutional portion is stricken,
remains a viable statute.
Id. at 352-53.
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The Court also pointed out that the Nebraska statute, particularly
the reciprocity provision, unconditionally prohibited the interstate
transfer of water even if an abundance of available water existed and
even though the most beneficial use of the resource might have existed
out-of-state. With this in mind, the Court found the only way a state
could justify its conservation-preservation program, via an absolute
statutory embargo scheme, would be to prove: (1) the entire state ex-
perienced a water shortage, (2) intrastate transportation of water from
locations of plentiful reserves to locations of scant supplies was feasible,
and (3) importation of water would compensate for the exportation of
water. Nebraska did not furnish such evidence; therefore, the reciproc-
ity provision was struck down as not reflecting a "close fit" with as-
serted state objectives. 22
Although recognizing that past cases, statutes, and interstate
agreements support Congressional deference to state water laws and
policies in some circumstances,23 the Court moreover rejected Ne-
braska's "suggestion that Congress ha[d] authorized the States to im-
pose otherwise impermissible burdens on interstate commerce in
ground water ... 24
Although the 37 statutes and the interstate compacts demonstrate
Congress' deference to state water law, they do not indicate that
Congress wished to remove federal constitutional constraints on
such state laws. The negative implications of the Commerce
Clause, like the mandates of the Fourteenth Amendment, are in-
gredients of the valid state law to which Congress has deferred.
Neither the fact that Congress has chosen not to create a federal
122. Sporhase, 102 S. Ct. at 3465. Through application of the Commerce
Clause, the Court is able to check unbridled state regulation of state water resources.
123. Nebraska cited 37 statutes, particularly the 1902 Reclamation Act which in
part "mandates that questions of water rights that arise in relation to a federal project
are to be determined in accordance with state law." Id. at 3466 (emphasis ad-
ded)(citing California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978), considering whether a
state may impose conditions on the United States Department of the Interior's appro-
priation of water for a federal reclamation project). Nebraska also referred the Court
to various interstate compacts "regarding rights to surface water" as evidence of Con-
gressional deference to state water laws. Sporhase, 102 S. Ct. at 3466 (emphasis
added).
124. Id. at 3465.
1550 Nova Law Journal 7:1983
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water law to govern water rights involved in federal projects, nor
the fact that Congress has been willing to let the States settle their
differences over water rights through mutual agreement, consti-
tutes persuasive evidence that Congress has consented to the unilat-
eral imposition of unreasonable burdens on commerce.125
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice O'Connor in his dissent,
pointed to turn-of-the-century case law in his attempt to bolster the
view that a state has the independent authority to manage its natural
resources.126 "In the exercise of this authority, a State may so regulate
a natural resource so as to preclude that resource from attaining the
status of an 'article of commerce' for the purposes of the negative im-
pact of the Commerce Clause. 1 27 Under the purview of Nebraska's
ground water law128 - which, according to the dissent, recognized only
a "usufructuary right"1 9 to ground water - Justice Rehnquist sug-
gested that "'[c]ommerce' [could not] exist in a natural resource that
[could not] be sold, rented, traded, or transferred, but only used ....
Nebraska so regulates ground water that it cannot be said that the
State permits any 'commerce,' intrastate or interstate, to exist in this
natural resource."130
Current Litigation and Policy
Most of what has been written regarding water transfers and
shortages has primarily concerned the western portion of the United
States.1 31 Because of the continuous attention drawn to the western
water problem, relatively little concern has been shown for the water
crises plaguing the largely populated urban centers of the eastern
states. These areas have suffered critical and alarmingly frequent
shortages which have triggered water use restrictions. 3 2
125. Id. at 3466.
126. Id. at 3468.
127. Id.
128. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
129. Sporhase, 102 S. Ct. at 3468.
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., Note, Interstate Transfer of Water: The Western Challenge to the
Commerce Clause, 59 TEx. L. REV. 1249 (1981).
132. See generally N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1982, at BI, col. 1; Canby, Our Most
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The Sporhase controversy is the tip of the iceberg, signalling fu-
ture litigation involving the access rights of arid regions versus the pro-
tectionist measures of the water-rich areas. For example, in City of El
Paso v. Reynolds,1'" the city of El Paso, Texas sued to challenge New
Mexico's absolute water "embargo" statute.134 It challenged the statute
as violative of the Commerce Clause on four grounds: (1) that New
Mexico's minimal intrastate water restrictions and regulations did not
illustrate a concern for conservation, (2) that New Mexico's regulations
Precious Resource: Water, 158-2 NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC 144 (August 1980). To
many, Florida is seen as a tropical environment, and consequently, one assumes the
existence of an abundance of water. Few people realize Florida's grave concern for a
continued fresh water supply. This was exhibited during the severe droughts of 1980
and 1981 when Floridians witnessed the water level of Lake Okeechobee, a major de-
pository of Florida's fresh water reserves, drop to alarmingly low levels. Victoria
Tschinkel, head of the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation, has said that
the water problem:
will tear the state apart politically .... There is a tension over the reali-
zation that in the long run there will be a struggle between agricultural
and phosphate interests versus the urban areas that are growing very rap-
idly and generally . .. in areas that are running out of water. Coastal
wells are being shut down because of salt water intrusion. They'll have to
go inland, and rural areas are looking down the road when they will be
developing, and their water is already spoken for.
N.Y. Times, July 7, 1982, at A17, col. 1.
133. Civ. No. 80-730-HB (D.N.M. Jan. 17, 1983).
134. The New Mexico embargo statute is as follows:
Removal of underground waters from state-
No person shall withdraw water from any underground source in New
Mexico for use in any other state by drilling a well in New Mexico and
transporting the water outside the state or by drilling a well outside the
boundaries of New Mexico and pumping water from under lands lying
within the boundaries of New Mexico; provided that nothing in this act
[72-12-18 to 72-12-21 NMSA 1978] prohibits the transportation of water
by tank truck from any underground source in New Mexico to any other
state where the water is used for exploration and drilling for oil or gas.
The owner of the well from which the water is withdrawn shall have a
duty to ascertain that the water exported is used only for the above pur-
poses and such owner shall keep and maintain accurate records of the
amount of water withdrawn and make such records available to the state
engineer of New Mexico upon request. The amount of water withdrawn
from any one well for such exportation shall never exceed three acre-feet.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12-19 (1978).
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lacked "evenhandedness," i.e., a balance between intrastate and inter-
state regulation as required under the present-day Pike analysis, (3)
that New Mexico allocated its water resources intrastate for all uses,
including so-called low priority uses, while simultaneously depriving
out-of-state users with the highest priority - economic and human
survival, and (4) that New Mexico's "absolute" restrictions were a
more obvious violation of the Constitution than Nebraska's "discretion-
ary" restrictions discussed in Sporhase.13 5
One of the major questions to be pondered in these cases is
whether the state's objectives in attempting to prevent exacerbated
water shortages could be realized through alternative methods, thereby
avoiding the alleged impact on interstate commercial activities. El Paso
suggested some possible alternatives to New Mexico's statutory
scheme: changes in the pattern of uses, improvements in irrigation effi-
ciency, desalinization projects, and importation of water, to name a
few. Furthermore, the focus ought to be when and where the water
may be put to its highest and most beneficial use."'6 In the El Paso
case, as well as in Sporhase, the time is now and the place is across
state lines for the highest and best use of water. Rather than accept
New Mexico's general assertion-that it needs to guard its water pre-
serves to offset future water shortages, El Paso responded: "To say that
at some time in the indefinite future there will be a shortage and that
this justifies the embargo is simply another way of saying that the state
should be free to restrict all water to use in-state, forever. 1 13 7
The New Mexico absolute water embargo statute was struck down
as unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause:
The purpose of the embargo is to promote New Mexico's economic
advantage. Even if the purpose were conservation and preservation,
as [New Mexico] maintain[s], the embargo does not significantly
advance the conservation and preservation of water. It certainly is
not narrowly tailored to achieve that purpose and cannot survive
strict scrutiny.138
135. See Plaintiffs' Supplemental Post-Trial Brief, City of El Paso v. Reynolds,
Civ. No. 80-730-HB (D.N.M. Jan. 17, 1983).
136. Id. at 21-24.
137. Id. at 27.
138. City of El Paso v. Reynolds, Civ. No. 80-730-HB, slip op. at 36 (D.N.M.
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New Mexico's intrastate water laws sustained a policy of "maxi-
mum beneficial use [which meant] putting as much water to beneficial
use as soon as possible."1 9 The court noted that El Paso is the "eco-
nomic hub of an interstate region which includes southern New Mexico
[and consequently,] the most beneficial and economically productive
use of [New Mexico's ground water] is in El Paso for the simple reason
that what is good for El Paso is good for the entire region, including
southern New Mexico."1 40
The. recent movement by the Great Lakes States to control any
diversion of water from the lakes of that region has been manifested in
a resolution1 41 forwarded to The White House. At first glance the reso-
Jan. 17, 1983).
139. Id. at 33.
140. Id. at 34.
141. Mackinac Resolution (prepared at Great Lakes Water Resources Confer-
ence, June 9-11, 1982). From June 9-11, 1982, the 1982 Great Lakes Water Resources
Conference was held at Mackinac Island, Michigan. The participant "Great Lakes
States" included Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Penn-
sylvania, Wisconsin, and the Canadian Provinces of Ontario and Quebec. The resolu-
tion regarding water "diversions" is reprinted here in its entirety. It includes an objec-
tion to any future diversion of Great Lakes water to alleviate the strains of fresh water
shortages that "already are apparent and are expected to reach major proportions in
the next decade . . ." in other parts of the United States. The resolution recognizes
"substantial increases in consumptive uses within the Basin over the next half century
to meet our own growing needs. . . . "The proposal notes the economic interest of the
participants and calls for the "concurrence" of the Great Lakes States, the United
States Federal Government, and the Federal Government of Canada and the provinces
contiguous to the Great Lakes system. Id. (emphasis added).
MACKINAC RESOLUTION
DIVERSIONS
WHEREAS, the States and Provinces in the Great Lakes Basin have been
blessed with an incomparable water resource; and
WHEREAS, increasing evidence points to severe freshwater shortages in
other parts of the United States, shortages that already are apparent
and are expected to reach major proportions in the next decade; and
WHEREAS, the search already has begun for alternative sources of water
for those regions, with support for some of that search coming from the
United States Federal Government; and
WHEREAS, the water of the Great Lakes is needed to meet the current
and future domestic, industrial, navigational, power, agricultural and
recreational needs of the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence region;
WHEREAS, the findings of the International Joint Commission's Great
1554 Nova Law Journal 7:19831
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lution appears reasonable, because the Great Lakes States speak of
Lakes Diversions and Consumptive Uses Study Board indicates that we
will be faced with substantial increases in consumptive uses within the
Basin over the next half century to meet our own growing needs; and
WHEREAS, the diversion of water from the Great Lakes Basin to other
water basins reduces the net supply of water available to the Great
Lakes Basin and lowers lake levels; and
WHEREAS, lowered lake levels and reduction of flows in connecting
channels could result in serious losses in water supply, navigation and
recreational values causing critical economic, social and environmental
problems adverse to the people of the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence
States and Provinces; and
WHEREAS, the wise use and development of the water resources of the
Great Lakes is essential to the economy and prosperity of the Great
Lakes and St. Lawrence States and Provinces; and
WHEREAS, the diversion of Great Lakes waters to other regions of the
United States or Canada could result in severe restrictions in the
growth and development of the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence region;
and
WHEREAS, it makes far more sense for development to occur where
abundant supplies of fresh water already exist, rather than moving the
water to other regions; and
WHEREAS, we share in the responsibility for the stewardship of the tre-
mendous natural resources which the Great Lakes provide;
WHEREAS, the Boundary Waters Agreement of 1909 requires that any
change in the flows and levels of any boundary waters is subject to
approval by the federal governments of both the United States and
Canada.
NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED by the Great Lakes States and
Provinces that based on existing information they object to any new
diversion of Great Lakes water for use outside the Great Lakes States
and Provinces; and
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that no future diversions be considered
until a thorough assessment, involving all jurisdictions contiguous to the
Great Lakes System, of the impacts on navigation, power generation
environment and socio-economic development for all said jurisdictions
takes place.
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that any future decision on the diversion
of Great Lakes water for use outside of the Great Lakes States and
Provinces be made only with the concurrence of the Great Lakes
States, the United States Federal Government, and the Federal Gov-
ernment of Canada and the Provinces contiguous to the Great Lakes
system.
17:1983
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"shar[ing] in the responsibility for the stewardship of the tremendous
natural resources which the Great Lakes provide . ,," and of a
"concurrence" among the Great Lakes States, the United States Fed-
eral Government, and the Canadian Government. But the motives ac-
companying these written words align themselves with the "protection-
The Canadian Government and its provinces are included, as well as the United
States Federal Government, because of an international treaty between the United
States and Canada regarding the Great Lakes. See Boundary Water Treaty, Jan. 11,
1909, United States-Great Britain, 36 Stat. 2448, T.S. No. 548, and Great Lakes
Water Quality Agreement, Nov. 22, 1978, United States-Canada 30 U.S.T. 1383,
T.I.A.S. No. 9257.
Apparently, the participants at the Great Lakes Water Resources Conference in-
tended to follow through on their commitments made at the Conference. Former Mich-
igan Governor William Milliken is now the chairman of the board of the Center for the
Great Lakes which was recently established in Chicago, Illinois. The Center, says Mil-
liken, wants to help those involved with plans for the future of the Great Lakes, partic-
ularly water diversion from the lakes, to "make their decisions on an informed basis."
69 A.B.A. J. 152 (1983).
See also H.R. 5278 proposed bill, which, if it had passed, would have prohibited
the interstate transfer or sale of water by any state part of an interstate water system
unless there was prior agreement among all the states affected. Introduced by Repre-
sentative Berkley Bedell (D-Iowa), H.R. 5278 read as follows:
A BILL
To prohibit any State from selling or otherwise transferring
interstate waters located in such State for use outside such
State unless all other States in the drainage basin of such wa-
ters consent to such sale or transfer.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That no State shall sell or oth-
erwise transfer, for use outside of such State, water which is taken from
any river or other body of surface which is located in or which passes
through more than one State or any aquifer or other body of ground water
which underlies more than one State unless-
(1) there is in effect an interstate compact (A) between the States in
the drainage basin of such river or other body of surface water, or (B)
between the affected States, in the case of such an aquifer or other body of
ground water, which governs such sale or transfer, and
(2) all the States which are parties to such compact consent to sucfi
sale or transfer.
H.R. 5278, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
142. Mackinac Resolution supra note 141.
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ist" camp. 143 It is precisely this type of proposed "constituent
legislation" which feeds the controversy, promotes self-regard, and of-
fers little toward easing the tension between those who have and those
who do not have.
In addition to current litigation and policy concerns on the subject
of interstate transfer of water, it is important to note The National
Water Commission's Report to the President."" Its report, upon the
termination of its study of the nation's water policies in 1973, sug-
gested that Congress and the States look at various factors when ap-
proaching the issue of interstate transfer of water necessary to satisfy
the justified needs of those deprived. Among the considerations men-
tioned were local, regional, and national economic development, the
need to put water to its highest and best use, federal aid, environmental
concerns, and an equitable compensation system for the exporting
state.1,45 Unfortunately, balancing these concerns remains a difficult
task.
Conclusion
The Sporhase4 6 case has not entirely settled the issue of interstate
transfer of ground water. The United States Supreme Court, under the
Pike1 47 test, has sustained the constitutionality of the first three condi-
tions of section 46-613.01 of the Revised Statutes of Nebraska 48 _
143. As staff aide to former Michigan Governor William Milliken, William Rus-
tern explained the region's position:
We fully anticipate that one of the Western States will challenge our con-
tention that the Great Lakes belong to the states that surround them and
are not a national resource that can be tapped into by any state.
... Due to the population shift to the West and Southwest, the political
power in Congress is shifting .... When these areas really start hurting
for water, the obvious political solution will be to pipe more water. We
want to be ready for that.
Quade, Water Wars Predicted in a Thirsty Nation, 68 A.B.A. J. 1067 (1982).
144. NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, WATER POLI-
CiES FOR THE FUTURE (1973).
145. Id. at 317-33.
146. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 102 S. Ct. 3456 (1982).
147. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). For text of the Pike
test, see supra text accompanying note 104.
148. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-613.01 (1978). See supra text accompanying note
7:1983
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i.e., that the requested withdrawal of ground water be reasonable, not
contrary to Nebraska's conservation aims, and not detrimental to the
public welfare. Joy Sporhase and Delmer Moss must still, therefore,
apply for a permit from Nebraska's Director of Water Resources
before withdrawing ground water from their well, for irrigation of their
Nebraska and Colorado land. In effect, the permit will be issued at the
discretion of the Director of Water Resources dependent upon his eval-
uation of the request guided by the statutory conditions. Consequently,
Sporhase and Moss could conceivably be denied the permit, thus pro-
hibited from withdrawing quantities of ground water for their irrigation
needs. 149
All water embargo statutes classified as either absolute embargoes
or as embargoes triggered by the reciprocity requirement, 15 0 should be
eliminated as facially discriminatory legislation, and therefore uncon-
stitutional. The discretionary water embargo statutes, similar to the
Nebraska statute in Sporhase without the reciprocity provision, should
be scrutinized under the force of the Pike Commerce Clause balancing
test which was employed in Sporhase.'5 ' Although the Pike test fo-
cused on the effect of state legislation on interstate commerce balanced
by "evenhanded" intrastate regulation, it is mandatory to recognize
and incorporate into the balancing formula the individual, economic,
and survival interests at stake.
The Supreme court in Sporhase declared water an article of com-
merce thereby triggering Commerce Clause analysis. However, water
must also be appreciated and dealt with as an essential natural re-
source, and as such, "constituent legislation" which hinders its reasona-
108 for statute in its entirety.
149. See Sporhase, 102 S. Ct. at 3469 n.3 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). For this
very reason, all discretionary water embargo statutes must provide an appellate proce-
dure for those denied a permit.
150. For examples of the various water embargo statutes, see ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 45-153 (Supp. 1982-83); CAL. WATER CODE § 1230 (Deering 1977); COLO.
REV. STAT. §§ 101-103 (Supp. 1982); IDAHO CODE §§ 401-410 (1977); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 82a-726 (1977); MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-1-121 (1981); NEV. REV. STAT. §§
533.515-533.524 (1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:IA-5 (1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-
12-18, 72-12-19 (1978); OR. REV. STAT. § 537.810 (1977); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-2-8
(1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 90.03.300, 90.16.110, 90.16.120 (1962); Wyo.
STAT. § 41-3-115 (1977).
151. See supra text accompanying notes 117-22.
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ble use should be eliminated. There exists a fear that without water
"embargo" statutes, unchecked withdrawal and subsequent transfer of
ground water out-of-state will lead to an uncontrolled and rapid deple-
tion of water reserves. In the most recent statement on this issue, the
court in City of El Paso v. Reynolds152 mollified this fear: "The ab-
sence of an embargo statute will not create havoc in New Mexico's
system of ground water regulation. It will not result in unrestricted out-
of-state use or uncontrolled transfers of water. Interstate usage of
water can be restricted and controlled to the same extent as intrastate
usage." 153
Water, as both a natural resource and an article of commerce, is
needed for life. It is needed by individuals to pursue their livelihood.
"[A] State's interest in its resources must yield when . . . it interferes
with a nonresident's right to pursue a livelihood in a State other than
his own, a right protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
the Constitution."' Water is needed by communities throughout the
nation to foster and sustain economic growth. The Sporhase balancing
approach is clearly a step toward mitigating the controversy. Beyond
Sporhase and the declaration that absolute and reciprocal water em-
bargo statutes are unconstitutional, however, interstate compacts 55 to
govern in the area of interstate ground water transfer between states
may become necessary. These agreements will be especially applicable,
for example, to those states which overlie an interstate acquifer.158 Un-
til sporadic water shortages, surface water pollution, acid rain, and
conservation of water resources can be effectively managed, fresh
ground water reserves will continue to be tapped as an alternative
152. Civ. No. 80-730-HB (D.N.M. Jan. 17, 1983).
153. Id. slip op. at 31 (emphasis added).
154. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n of Montana, 436 U.S. 371, 386 (1978).
155. See supra note 5 for a discussion of interstate compacts.
156. The Ogallala aquifer, from which Sporhase and Moss were withdrawing
ground water, has a "multistate character" and underlies land in parts of Colorado,
Kansas, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas. See Sporhase, 102 S. Ct. at
3463 (1982) (footnote omitted). It would seem that those states which overlie the same
aquifer or ground water depository would desire the opportunity to design an interstate
compact to govern ground water withdrawal among those states. Six independent
ground water withdrawal policies and prohibitions, particularly in the case of the Ogal-
lala aquifer which underlies six states, accomplishes little toward achieving equitably
balanced withdrawals.
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source of water supply.
This note recommends the employment of interstate compacts to
govern in the area of interstate ground water transfer, similar to the
compacts initiated in the area of surface water diversions. 157 Moreover,
the surface water interstate compacts which currently contain dormant
ground water transfer provisions, 158 ought to be reviewed, amended,
and activated to avoid future conflict. The interstate compact is one
step shy of promoting a uniform federal water policy which would spe-
cifically administer the interstate transfer of ground water. Although a
national policy may seem feasible in order to terminate fifty indepen-
dent state policies which may not be in harmony with the national wel-
fare, the interstate compact enables the states to retain authority and
control in their area of expertise - local water management. The in-
terstate compact incorporates the federal component with the participa-
tion of a federal representative in the negotiation process between
states.10 9 Furthermore, Congressional consenting legislation, with or
without modification, is generally required under the United States
Constitution. l60 A uniform national policy presents the problem of the
extent to which the federal government would carve out the law and
place itself in the area of interstate water transfer, thereby impinging
on the traditional deference to state and local water management.16 1
Moreover, a federal policy would need to accommodate the various re-
gional interests and factors including the disparity in geography, cli-
mate, and consumptive use.16
The fact that two farmers were threatened with a shutdown of
their irrigation system because they were withdrawing ground water
from a neighboring state, is a signal to reevaluate the nation's water
laws and promote the sharing of our natural resources. This note illus-
157. See discussion supra note 5.
158. See, e.g., Susquehanna River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 91-575, 84 Stat.
1509, § 11.1 at 1523 (1970). This note does not assert that this particular compact's
ground water provision is dormant. Rather, citation is made as an example of a ground
water provision in an interstate compact.
159. See discussion supra note 5.
160. See discussion supra note 5.
161. See Sporhase, 102 S. Ct. at 3465-66.
162. See generally Sporhase, 102 S. Ct. at 3462 n.13 (1982)(citing California v.
United States, 438 U.S. 645, 648 (1978)).
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trates precisely the type of "warring" between the states that the Com-
merce Clause and the Constitution sought to prevent:
In [interstate commerce], instead of the states, a new power ap-
pears and a new welfare, a welfare which transcends that of any
State. . . .[L]et us say it is constituted of the welfare of all of the
States, and that of each State is made greater by a division of its
resources, natural and created, with every other State, and those of
every other State with it. This was the purpose, as it is the result,
of the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution of the United
States.163
As Justice Cardozo has said, the Constitution "was framed upon the
theory that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim together,
and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not
division."'
Gary S. Betensky
163. West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 255 (1911).
164. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935).
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